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The Right to Medical Treatment
TAUNYA LOVELL BANKS

The public's fear of contracting AIDS is escalating as the syndrome spreads.
Unfortunately, this fear of AIDS is also high among members of the medical
profession and is a special concern of health care workers in hospitals across
the nation. 1 The term "medical professionals" includes nurses, doctors, lab
technicians, ambulance drivers, paramedics, as well as people in other
professions, such as funeral directors and embalmers. Many medical professionals are refusing to treat people with AIDS, even though current medical
studies indicate that the occupational risk of transmission of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (mv) is minimal. 2 Medical treatment has even been
denied to some merely because they are members of AIDS high-risk groups. 3
Until recently, fear of AIDS within the medical community did not create
a serious problem, because most of the early AIDS cases were confined to
established, active, urban gay communities. Initially, the primary health
care providers for most people with AIDS were physicians close to the gay
community. However, many other physicians with highly developed ethical .,
standards feel an obligation to treat patients with AIDS. 4
"'
As the number of AIDS cases increases, however, the general medical
community will be forced to become more involved in the care of people
with AIDS. As AIDS spreads beyond large coastal cities, and becomes more
commonplace, people with the disease will come into contact not just with
sophisticated, cosmopolitan physicians, but with general practitioners and
a wide variety of ordinary health care workers. Further, with improved
understanding of other illnesses such as AIDS-Related Complex (ARc) and
progress in ability to detect the presence of HIV, more demands will be made
on the medical community for treatment and counseling of people who have
been exposed to the virus but have not developed AIDS.
Several commentators, relying on anecdotal information, suggest that fear
of infection has caused the general medical community to be reluctant in
175
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treating patient with AIDS and ARC. 5 For example, two paramedics in Los
Angeles were sued for allegedly not providing proper medical assistance to
a heart attack victim because they believed he had AIDS. In another instance,
a nationally known heart surgeon refused to operate on anyone infected
with HIV. 6
Since unlike other terminal illnesses such as cancer, AIDS is contagious,
physicians are forced by AIDS to decide how much personal risk they are
willing to assume. Two writers recently noted, "[h]istorically, physicians
have tacitly accepted an occupational risk of exposure to fatal infectious
diseases .... Only the current generation of physicians, trained after the
development of effective antibiotics, has never confronted this potential
occupational risk. " 7 Some physicians choose not to work with AIDS patients,
while others elect to care for people with AIDS only when necessary. 8
As the epidemic grows, these fears of infection are likely to result in an
increase in refusals to treat. The problem, then, is to determine what legal
obligation:if any, the medical community has to provide care to people who
are ill with AIDS or ARC, or infected with HIV.
OBLIGATIONS OF PRIVATE PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS

While people with AIDS undoubtedly deserve access to adequate medical
care, the law does not ensure such access. Because the law views the relationship between a private physician and her patient as consensual, a physician has no legal duty to treat. 9 The reasoning behind this rule is that a
private physician is not responsible for a stranger's misfortune she did not
cause.
The American Medical Association's Code of Ethics states that "in an
emergency [a physician] should render service to the best of his ability."
Nevertheless, most courts refuse to impose on physicians a broad legal duty
to treat, even in an emergency. 10 A rather limited duty to treat has been
recognized and is the subject of the following section.
.,
The Duty to Treat under Common Law and Statute

A physician-patient relationship rests upon an express or implied contract,
with most relationships created by implication. 11 Making an appointment
with a physician, receiving an examination, and beginning treatment imply
the existence of a contract between physician and patient. 12 This contract,
however, does not guarantee future care. Even where the physician has
previously treated a patient for an illness and may be considered the family
physician, she may be under no legal duty to treat a patient for a new illness. 13
A physician may, by notice or by special agreement, limit the extent and
scope of her practice, excluding certain diseases or medical conditions. 14
Thus a person with AIDS or ARC may have difficulty obtaining medical care
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from private physicians, even those with whom she has some preexisting
relationship.
A patient affiliated with a health maintenance organization (HMO) may
have more rights than a person with a private physician. 15 By paying regular
fees for the right of access to the HMo's services, members establish an ongoing contractual relationship with the HMO. Unless the contract specifically
excludes treatment for AIDS or ARC, the HMO may be liable if its health care
professionals refuse to treat members with those conditions. This liability
does not necessarily extend to health care personnel employed by the HMO.
Their individual duty to treat may depend upon the terms of their employment contracts with the HMO rather than their relationship with the patient.
Recently, many courts have suggested that a legal duty to treat may be
created in another manner. Based on tort rather than contract theory, this
duty is commonly referred to as "personal encounters or undertakings." A
physician may incur the duty by agreeing to treat a specific, as opposed to
an unspecified, illness. 16 Thus, a duty to treat may arise when a patient is
referred by one physician to a second physician for treatment of a specific
problem and the second physician accepts the referral. 17 However, at least
one court has held that no legal duty was created where an associate of the
treating doctor was consulted by telephone over a decision to hospitalize a
patient. 18 Similarly, where a doctor merely converses with the treating physician about the treatment of a patient, a duty to treat may not exist.
Physicians who contemplate refusing to treat people with AIDS or ARC
should be aware that while the courts have not imposed any general duty
to treat on private physicians in the absence of some close connection to
the patient, whether they will continue to adhere to the traditional "no
duty" view is open to question.
Common law obligations fashioned by courts are not the only means by
which physicians may be obliged to render care. Statutes may also address
the rights and obligations of physicians. Several states, for example, have
enacted "good Samaritan laws" that limit the liability of people who provide
emergency assistance. These laws do not require physicians ~o treat all
persons in life threatening circumstances, 19 but their purpose is to encourage
qualified individuals to provide emergency care by protecting them from
lawsuits. Where she chooses to treat, the physician is not legally liable for
injuries to the victim unless she is grossly negligent. In the few states that
require treatment in emergency situations, the physician is required to treat
only if she was at the scene when an accident occurred. 20 Thus even the
most demanding good Samaritan law rarely imposes any legal duty to treat.
Duty to Treat under Antidiscrimination Legislation

Of greater potential benefit to persons with AIDS are antidiscrimination statutes. Although a growing number of cities 21 and states 22 have specifically
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prohibited various kinds of discrimination against people with AIDS, many
more cities and states have not acted to prevent such discrimination. However, forty-seven states and many cities have general antidiscrimination laws,
many of which prohibit discrimination against the physically disabled. 23
Twenty-one states have formally declared that their handicap-discrimination
provisions will be construed to include AIDS as a handicap, and five states
have unofficial policies to that effect. 24 Where state antidiscrimination laws
prohibit discrimination in public accommodations-places or services representing themselves as open to the general public-they may be interpreted
to include the provision of medical and dental care. 25 Washington state, for
example, has interpreted its statute concerning discrimination based on
handicap in public accommodations to apply to AIDS-based discrimination
in dental offices, doctors' offices, hospitals, and nursing homes. 26 Under
such a statute, a physician who refused to treat a person with AIDS or ARC
would be acting illegally.
Recently, several California cities have enacted laws prohibiting discrimination against people with AIDS. These laws are exemplary and will probably
be used as models for future local ordinances. They cover discrimination in
medical and dental treatment and clearly include people with ARC, people
harboring the virus, and people suspected of having AIDS. 27 Protection for
people in the first two categories is also important because they may suffer
discrimination when they seek ordinary medical and dental services which
are not related to illnesses associated with AIDS. It would also be capricious
for a statute to mandate that those who are gravely ill with full-blown AIDS
should be treated while those who are mildly ill with ARC and more responsive
to treatment can be ignored by physicians.
One state ·(Wisconsin) 28 and several localities 29 have laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual preference that can be used to combat discrimination against healthy people in high-risk categories because of the
connection, real or imagined, between AIDS and their life style. For example,
a dentist who refuses appointments to gay men because she fears AIDS could.,
be charged with discrimination against gay men. 30 Sexual preference laws
could not, of course, be used by heterosexual people faced with AIDs-based
discrimination.
Termination of the Relationship
A physician often agrees to treat a patient for a specific illness. But as with

any consensual relationship, either party is free to end the relationship before
treatment is completed. Nevertheless, public policy considerations have led
to certain limits on the physician's right to terminate the relationship. The
physician may not leave a critically ill patient without making provisions for
her care. Such conduct would constitute abandonment, and the physician
would be legally liable for any resulting damage. 31
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Unlawful abandonment can take many forms: the outright refusal to treat
a patient further; the premature discharge by the physician of a patient from
the hospital; the refusal to treat a patient on a timely basis. 32 Even the
patient's failure to pay the physician's fee may not be an adequate basis for
the abandonment of a patient in need of medical care. 33
Since liability will attach to a physician who abandons a patient at a critical
stage of an illness or disease, and the course of AIDS and ARC is so unpredictable, it might be difficult for a physician treating a person with AIDS or
ARC to terminate unilaterally an on-going relationship with the patient without risking legal liability. Therefore, a physician should be careful to ensure
that the patient has obtained other competent medical care before ending
the relationship.
Hospital Staff

The law treats physicians working in hospitals differently from independent
physicians. A physician employed by a hospital is generally required to treat
any patient the hospital admits. 34 In agreeing to work for the hospital, the
physician waives the right to choose her patients. 35 Likewise, medical students, nurses, and other health care workers affiliated with hospitals or
health care organizations are obligated to care for all admitted patients. 36
Hospital employees' obligation to treat may be modified by hospital regulation or labor agreement, either of which may restore to staff the right to
select patients. 37 Furthermore, employees covered by the Occupational
Health and Safety Act may refuse to do anything that threatens their safety. 38
As mentioned previously, however, current medical research indicates that
the risk of HIV transmission to health care workers in hospitals is negligible.
Thus health care workers probably could not successfully assert a threat to
their safety as a valid basis for refusing to treat an AIDS patient admitted to
the hospital. 39 (For more information on employment law, see Chapter 8.)
Some hospitals assign to AIDS patients only those staff member? who volunteer to care for them, reasoning that willing professionals a;e likely to
provide better and more sensitive treatment. 40 The use of volunteers also
allows hospitals to avoid the problem of firing employees who refuse to care
for persons with AIDS.
HOSPITALS' DUTY TO TREAT

The treatment of AIDS patients places greater burdens on hospitals than the
treatment of most other patients. People with AIDS tend to be hospitalized
frequently, often for long periods. 41 The cost of treating people with AIDS
exceeds the average cost of treating many catastrophic illnesses, 42 and many
43
AIDS patients lack full insurance coverage for hospitalization.
AIDS patients
also require almost twice as much nursing care as patients with other terminal
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illnesses. 44 As a result, institutional pressures to prohibit or severely limit
the hospitalization of people with AIDS are strong. In addition, many private
hospitals strive to avoid the "stigma" of being characterized as AIDS hospitals,
fearing that other patients will not be referred to them. 45
Private Hospitals

As a general rule, a private hospital is under no legal duty to admit and
treat all who seek care. 46 Even the receipt of federal funds does not substantially affect the discretion of private hospitals in selecting patients. 47
Some jurisdictions recognize an exception to this rule in the case of private
hospitals with "well established" emergency facilities, 48 and some states have
passed statutes requiring every hospital to admit persons in need of emergency care. 49 And while, in the absence of such requirements, most private
hospitals act on what they perceive as a professional obligation to treat
people in life threatening circumstances, the provision of emergency care
creates no obligation to treat the patient further, and private hospitals may
refuse comprehensive treatment without liability. 50 This practice, although
legally permissible, is frowned upon by many in the medical profession.
The antidiscrimination laws discussed earlier may apply to private hospitals either directly or indirectly in their capacity as places of public accommodation. 51 If covered by such laws, a hospital that refused to treat a
person with, or suspected of having, AIDS or ARC, could be liable for any
resulting injury. Liability for discrimination might prove costly, since many
of the relevant statutes provide not only for compensatory damages, including emotional injury, but also for punitive damages. 52 Thus antidiscrimination laws will effectively impose greater duties on private hospitals than
does the common law, although even under the common law, a court might
be persuaded to impose a higher duty on a hospital that was the only accessible facility in the community.
Nonprofit hospitals may be exempt from taxation as charitable organizations. 53 Hospitals that refuse to treat AIDS patients risk losing their taX'
exempt status. In defining "charitable" in this context, the federal government has suggested that "charitable" hospitals must "provid[ e medical care]
for all those persons in the community able to pay the cost thereof." One
ruling also stressed the importance of a hospital operating an emergency
room open to all community members, even those who cannot pay. 54 The
force of these rulings may be diminished in practice by the fact that individuals cannot sue to revoke an organization's tax exempt status. 55 The
initiative can be taken only by the government.
Public Hospitals

At common law, even a public hospital supported by public tax funds had
no duty to accept and treat everyone nor any duty to maintain an emergency
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room. However, if a public hospital does maintain an emergency room, the
hospital cannot refuse to provide emergency treatment to a person because
that person has or is suspected of having a specific disease. 56
Furthermore, courts enforcing federal antidiscrimination laws would most
likely forbid a public hospital to refuse nonemergency care to a person solely
because she had ARC or AIDS. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that any classification by government imposing different benefits or burdens on people must be rationally related to a legitimate
government objective. (For a detailed discussion of the equal protection
clause, see Chapter 4.) Since AIDS cannot be transmitted through casual
contact, neither other patients nor health care personnel are endangered by
57
AIDS patients,
so denying care to people with AIDS cannot rationally be
related to protecting a hospital's staff and patients from risk of infection. A
city, county, or state with a policy denying access to publicly financed health
care services by people with or suspected of having AIDS may violate those
persons' right to equal treatment, especially in life threatening circumstances. The governmental entity would have to demonstrate that denying people
with AIDS equal access to public life-saving facilities was rationally related
to some legitimate governmental objective.
OTHER RELATED SERVICES

Ambulance Service

Very little law exists in this area. Most cases involve situations where the
ambulance service provided transportation and was sued for operating the
ambulance in a negligent manner. In assessing liability the courts look at
the ambulance service and determine whether it is gratuitous, operated for
a profit, or owned and operated by the city, county, or state. 58
At least one lawsuit has been filed involving the refusal to provide city
ambulance service to a person wrongly suspected of having AJ,DS. 59 Until
September 1985, the District of Columbia permitted posting the names of
people with AIDS on the chalkboards of city firehouses, reasoning that it had
an obligation to inform ambulance personnel of persons with contagious
diseases so that precautionary measures could be taken. Only protest from
the local gay community forced the discontinuation of this practice. 60
Whether an ambulance service may refuse to transport a person suspected
of having AIDS or ARC depends on whether the service has a legal duty to
provide service to all in need. Privately owned and operated services would
probably not be found to have a duty to provide services to all who requested
them. Like private physicians, they are free to select their customers/
patients.
If the ambulance could be classified as a common carrier, however, a
duty to provide services to all might follow. As one court defines them,
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" [c]ommon carriers of passengers are those who undertake to carry all
persons indifferently who apply for passage. " 61 The common carrier characterization is important because most antidiscrimination laws cover common carriers. 62 Where antidiscrimination laws prohibit discrimination based
on disability, a refusal to transport an AIDS or ARC patient would probably
be illegal. Antidiscrimination laws cover private services classified as common carriers as well as ambulance services that provide their services to the
general public for no charge.
Some ambulance services provide transportation only to persons who are
"members" of the service, that is, those who pay a membership fee entitling
them to access to the service. These services are not considered common
carriers. Therefore they could refuse to provide service to a nonmember
suspected of having AIDS. However, the membership ambulance service
would probably be liable for refusing to provide services to a member with
AIDS or suspocted of having AIDS, on a breach of contract theory. Of course,
membership ambulance services could, by contract, restrict the type of cases
for which they would provide service, thereby avoiding legal liability for
refusing to transport a member who had AIDS.
Many jurisdictions have laws requiring a publicly owned and operated
ambulance service to transport any person to or from the hospital in an
emergency. These laws may also apply to services that are operated only
partly at public expense. 63
Residential Health Care Facilities

Most residential health care facilities or nursing homes are privately operated
and not open to all who request admittance. Many of these facilities have
refused to accept people with AIDS. 64 Legally there is not much one can do
to force them to admit people with AIDS. since the facilities are free to
determine what types of medical cases they will admit. This refusal of residential health care facilities to admit people with AIDS creates a problem
for hospitals: It means they are unable to discharge people with AIDS who
no longer require specialized hospital care but are unable to care for
themselves.
Generally hospitals have a duty not to discharge prematurely a patient
who has been admitted for treatment. Thus it may be unlawful to discharge
involuntarily a person not well enough to care for herself. 65 The absence of
alternative residential care makes discharge planning very difficult and also
increases the costs for both patient and hospital. Recently, special hospices
and residential health care facilities for people with AIDS have been established in cities with a high incidence of AIDS. Most often these centers are
small and designed to serve only local AIDS patients. Thus persons from areas
with relatively low numbers of AIDS cases may be the most harmed by discriminatory practices of residential health care facilities.

~
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Funeral Homes and Cemeteries

Many funeral homes are reluctant to handle the remains of AIDS patients.
A few homes have refused to even accept the bodies of persons who have
died from AIDS, but more have discriminated in the provision of servicesrefusing to embalm and charging extra for handling people with AIDS. 66
Because the embalming process may result in the release of contaminated
body fluids, the Centers for Disease Control has issued guidelines for funeral
homes that handle the remains of AIDS patients. 67 However, as one embalmer
stated, these precautions are no greater than those taken with other bodies. 68
Since funeral homes are privately operated, they have a measure of discretion in whom they serve, though they are subject to regulation by the
state. 69 However, where funeral homes are classified as public accommodations, as they are in several states, 70 and where laws forbid discrimination
based on disability, the refusal to provide services might be held illegal,
depending on whether the court believes that the antidiscrimination laws
apply only to living persons. A New York state court has held that legal
protections "are not extinguished with the end of life," in giving the New
York City Commission on Human Rights authority to prosecute funeral
homes which discriminated on the basis of AIDS. 71
The right to "decent burial" according to the usual custom in the neighborhood has long been recognized at common law, although the decedent
may not necessarily be buried in the plot of her choice. 72 Religious or other
institutions can place restrictions on who will be interned in their burial
grounds. 73 Advocates for the deceased AIDS patient has several legal arguments to ensure that she is properly buried. A number of cases hold that
cemeteries cannot discriminate in the sale of burial plots on the basis of
race, since federal law prohibits discrimination based upon race in the sale
or rental of property. 74 An analogous claim might be brought by an AIDS
patient. Ownership of a lot in a cemetery gives a right to burial therein that,
subject to certain religious considerations, the cemetery may no~unreason
ably abridge. 75 If a plot owner were to develop AIDS after purchasing the
plot, her disease may not alter her right to be buried in her plot. Furthermore, courts may give some weight to the deceased's wishes concerning the
disposition of her body. 76
Some AIDS and disability antidiscrimination laws apply to cemeteries directly, or indirectly as public accommodations. 77 Under these laws a privately
operated cemetery that was selling burial plots to the general public but
refused to sell a plot to a person with AIDS, or to the family of a person who died from AIDS, would be acting illegally. Refusals by public cemeteries owned and operated by some unit of the government to bury a person
solely because that person had AIDS would be of doubtful legality since
the government would have to show some rational basis for AIDs-based
discrimination.
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Unfortunately, the law does not automatically require all health care
providers to care for people with AIDS. It seems strange that innkeepers and
taxicab drivers may owe more of a duty to strangers than physicians, even
though the latter provide life-saving and life sustaining services. But the law
regarding the physician's duty to treat is unlikely to change in the near
future. To require a physician to provide medical care in a nonemergency
situation is perceived as akin to requiring involuntary servitude.
Nevertheless, in light of the growing AIDS epidemic, states need to reexamine existing antidiscrimination and good Samaritan laws. These laws
should prevent AIDs-based discrimination in medical treatment. No one
should be allowed to go without medical treatment simply because she has
a terminal illness. To allow this would demonstrate total disregard for the
value of human life.

